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Oversight and Accountability of Water
Privatization Contracts: A Proposed
Legislative Policy
By Mary Strayhorne*

S

afe drinking water is essential to human survival and is
the center of an international debate over the privatization
of public access to this vital, but increasingly scarce, natural resource.1 This problem has even arisen in the United States,
where potable water remains widely available but has become
increasingly scarce in many cities.2 A key issue entrenched
within this debate is whether local governments should allow
private companies to control, maintain, and service municipal
water infrastructure and service systems.3 Sustainability scholars and conservationists are concerned that current privatization allows private companies to generate profits at the expense
of municipal water source communities.4 Despite these concerns, many municipalities are entering privatization contracts
with private water companies to reduce the financial burden to
upgrade, maintain, and operate water infrastructure and shift the
cost-induced rate increases away from political responsibility.5
This feature article proposes a federal or state legislative policy
that would promote local community stewardship by conditioning certain appropriations on municipal grants of privatization
contracts. The primary goals of this stewardship would address
accountability and oversight concerns over private control of
municipal water and sanitation.6 This article proposes a policy
for granting privatization contracts to private water companies,
requiring a municipality to show the private company (1) is a
domestically owned, operated, and incorporated company, (2)
with a business purpose that involves a direct benefit to the target
local community’s market, and (3) employs a certain percentage
of municipal residents as a prerequisite to granting privatization
contracts.7
Water privatization gained momentum in the United States
during the 1980s and into the 1990s, with an increased need to
update or replace municipal water infrastructure, reduce water
consumption rates, and comply with federal drinking water
quality standards.8 As of 2007, approximately 600 U.S. cities
within forty-three states had entered into municipal water privatization contracts.9 Faced with limited revenue, many of these
municipalities saw privatization as the only practical solution for
providing water to the community but often failed to preserve
“ecological integrity and sustainability” of the community that
provided the water source.10 For example, the City of Atlanta,
Georgia entered into a twenty-year contract with United Water,
a U.S. subsidiary of Suez Environment, a French-owned water
company that provides water services to approximately 115 million people in 130 countries.11 After only four years, the city terminated the contract due to Suez’ inability to address systemic
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failures in water system infrastructure repair and maintenance
that caused severe service interruptions, water waste, and threats
to public health.12
In the Atlanta-Suez water contract debacle, privatization
failed to adequately serve a beneficial function, and it cost the
city valuable natural and financial resources that exacerbated
an already developing water shortage.13 The problems Atlanta
faced following the privatization of its municipal water system,
combined with its increasing sprawl, left the city with a higher
demand for water from its primary supply at Lake Lanier.14 This
increased demand has further strained a water supply source
feeding areas in Florida and Alabama.15
From a stewardship standpoint, the private water companies servicing many U.S. cities and municipalities are often
far-removed from the communities they serve, making them
less accountable to these communities.16 Some argue that this
distance leads to a lack of community and environmental stewardship and has bolstered bottled water sales by undermining
the public confidence in public water service.17 Other challenges
presented by water privatization manifest in poor long-term
management planning and a primary focus on cost reduction.
These management priorities both lead to subpar construction
and maintenance of water infrastructures and potential negative
environmental impacts.18 Private companies providing water
services to locations beyond their bases of operation have no
significant incentive to build or maintain public water systems
for long-term community financial or environmental benefits
beyond the expiration or termination of their operating contracts.19 Indeed, the evolution of environmental law in the United
States demonstrates that environmental considerations tend to
take a back seat to fiscal objectives in private enterprise strategies.20 With this in mind, the accountability of private water
service providers and state legislatures is necessary to ensure the
protection of local water resource availability, quality, and cost.
A proposed legislative policy that conditions federal or state
funding on municipal promotion of private water company stewardship would address many problems faced by underfunded
municipalities. By conditioning state funding on promoting
public service stewardship, states would be incentivized to
implement the policy. A typical state policy would require the
private public service provider to be a domestically owned, operated, and incorporated company within the state itself, allowing
continued on page 62
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local government to keep the private entity under close scrutiny
and empower states to revoke the company’s contract should the
company act against its stated purpose. The only exception may
be allowing foreign benefits corporations to pledge to provide
a public benefit to the state in which it wishes to incorporate.21
Many states have enacted statutes allowing foreign and domestic
entities to incorporate as benefits corporations, provided their
articles and bylaws state a purpose that involves a benefit to society or the environment, or both.22 To modify current policy, the
enabling statute that empowers municipalities to enter into privatization contracts would stipulate that the stated purpose of the
corporation would include a declaration to directly provide an
identifiable and enforceable benefit to the incorporating state.23
Finally, under this policy, any privatized contract for water
infrastructure, service upgrades or maintenance, funded in
whole or in part by municipal or public funds, should be subject
to resident hiring requirements.24 Case law and current trends
have tested the constitutionality and authority of state governments to require private companies working on public contracts
funded with public funds to fulfill certain requirements, such

as the employment of an established percentage of municipal
residents.25 These employment requirements would serve a
quality assurance and oversight function by putting responsible,
accountable stakeholders in control of the daily operations provided for in the privatization contract.26
In light of looming resource shortages, past mismanagement, and systemic water service failures due to a lack of effective oversight, the time has come to promote accountability on
the state level for those entities seeking to gain private control
of natural resources.27 This accountability must allow states
and municipalities to maintain some level of control over these
resources and promote the stewardship of local communities
by private public service entities. This proposed policy would
allow local control of resources but create an accountability
mechanism making state legislatures accountable to Congress,
and the people and private water companies accountable to state
legislatures. Furthermore, this accountability policy will further
protect municipal water resource availability and the integrity
of water management and maintenance infrastructures for future
generations.
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